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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, PEACE, AND PREVENTION 
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW SCHOOL 
OCTOBER 26, 2010 
Juan E. Mendezt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am deeply honored to be invited to deliver this prestigious annual 
lecture, and very grateful for your presence here today. 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant 
against a sitting head of state for crimes against an ethnic minority 
that, at least prima facie, the court characterizes as genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity. In defiance, President Omar Al 
Bashir of Sudan has expelled humanitarian aid organizations, gotten 
himself "re-elected", and continues to detain and torture Sudanese 
human rights activists on the pretext of their supposed cooperation 
with the ICC. President Al Bashir also threatens to refuse his 
country's consent for other actions of the international community 
designed to avoid crises in Darfur, Southern Sudan, and the oil-rich 
area of Abyei. In some quarters, the action of the ICC is seen as an 
example of the pursuit of justice at all costs and one that threatens to 
provoke further and more serious human rights violations than it 
attempts to resolve. Fortunately, the most dire predictions about the 
effect of the arrest warrant did not materialize, but the event 
illustrates the potential for a perceived conflict between two 
legitimate values and interests of the international community: 
accountability for international crimes and the prevention of similar, 
new abuses in an ongoing conflict. 
Only a few years before the indictment of President Al Bashir, a 
similar debate seemed to call into question the idea of a permanent 
international court designed to provide justice to victims of human 
rights abuse when Joseph Kony demanded that the warrant for his 
arrest and that of other leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army be 
quashed as a condition for his participation in peace talks to bring the 
conflict in Northern Uganda to an end. Well-meaning conflict 
t Visiting Professor, Washington College of Law, The American University. The 
author acknowledges the invaluable research assistance of Ms. Kavita Kapur, JD 
candidate, 2011. 
365 
366 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
resolution specialists accused the ICC and its prosecutor of making 
peace impossible by refusing to accommodate Kony's demands. In 
Northern Uganda, the issue was characterized-in an over-
simplification-as one of "Peace versus Justice." In Darfur, since 
there were no active peace talks at the time of the arrest warrant, the 
conflict-if any-was between Justice and Prevention. In both cases, 
however, the dilemmas are closely related, and they force us to 
reckon with whether and how we can pursue both justice and peace, 
and justice and prevention, when those values seem to be at odds 
with each other. 
Of course, stating that justice, peace, and prevention are all equally 
valuable; that they are not in contradiction with each other; and that 
they are mutually reinforcing does not solve the problem. We need 
to find ways to honor all three in practice, not just as a matter of lofty 
principles. For that, we probably need to understand prevention in all 
its dimensions. We also need to consider peace as something beyond 
the immediate silencing of the guns and, particularly, what terms will 
ensure a lasting peace, rather than simply a lull in fighting. 
Moreover, we also need to approach justice with a comprehensive, 
balanced approach, one that includes, but is not limited to, 
punishment of those bearing the highest responsibility for the most 
. . 
senous cnmes. 
II. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
The set of mechanisms and practices that over the last quarter 
century have been used in widely different cultures to confront 
legacies of mass atrocities can offer solutions to the dilemmas of 
justice, peace, and prevention. Those practices have come to be 
designated under the label of "transitional justice," and their 
advantage lies in the fact that they consist of truly universal 
principles that must be applied in each case according to contextual 
and cultural conditions. This adaptation to circumstances does not 
diminish the universality of the values and objectives that the 
practices aim to realize; on the contrary, it enriches each experiment 
with the lessons learned from other applications and experiences. 
"Transitional justice" alludes to the need to confront mass atrocities 
of the recent past while realizing the values of truth, justice, 
reparations for victims, and institutional reform. Truth must be 
sought and disclosed in an official way so that there can be no denial 
of the atrocities committed and so that the circumstances of each 
violation, and the fate and whereabouts of each victim, can be 
established through the best evidence available. Justice consists first 
and foremost of investigation, prosecution, and punishment of those 
abuses that constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity, and 
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targeting those most responsible for them. Reparations should 
consist of both moral gestures and monetary compensation that 
recognizes the plight of victims and their families and restores to 
them their worth as first-class citizens in the society that has recently 
allowed their victimization. State institutions that have been the 
vehicle for the perpetration of atrocities must be thoroughly reformed 
so that in the future, no leaders can abuse their authority in order to 
commit human rights violations. Each of these avenues must be 
pursued in good faith and to the best of the State's abilities. They 
should not be conditioned on each other because inability to make 
any progress in one of them does not relieve the State from its 
responsibility to pursue the other three. On the other hand, it is of 
course advisable to pursue all four in a balanced, comprehensive, 
"holistic" way. 
The adjective "transitional" is not meant to qualify the value of 
justice to be sought, but rather alludes to the special obstacles to the 
realization of justice that characterize transitions from dictatorship to 
democracy or from justice to peace. Transitional justice is 
emphatically not some sort of "justice light." It is also not meant to 
offer a way out of, or be a substitute for, criminal prosecution of the 
main perpetrators but to supplement their indispensable punishment 
with other non-judicial measures that can offer a more 
comprehensive redress to the whole universe of mass atrocities. 
Undoubtedly, criminal prosecution will always be the most difficult 
of the tasks of transitional justice, not only because of the pressures 
in favor of impunity but also because it will have to be conducted 
with the most rigorous respect for the principles of fair trial and due 
process of law, and often in a context where the State's judiciary has 
been devastated by the conflict or by the dictatorship's actions. And 
yet, if transitional justice is to be meaningful, it must include at its 
core the determination to uphold the principle that some crimes are so 
egregious that they cannot be left unpunished. 
Significantly, the experiences of the last twenty-five years have 
yielded not only a series of "best practices" but have also resulted in 
a series of "emerging norms" in international law with respect to 
what states owe to the victims-individual and collective-of mass 
atrocItIes. Indeed, "emerging" might not be the best way to 
characterize these norms because their existence and binding nature 
are now very widely recognized. In addition, they are not actually 
new norms but rather authoritative interpretations of existing human 
rights standards as applied to the realities of transitions. Providing 
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even a few examples of this evolution in the international law of 
human rights would exceed the limits of this presentation. 1 These 
precedents have been the source of comprehensive United Nations 
reports that both take stock of normative evolution and advance 
standards with a view to future adoption. 2 Contemporaneously with 
these societal practices in transitional states, the international 
community decided in the 1990s to incorporate accountability for 
grave crimes into the arsenal of measures available in the pursuit of 
peace and security among nations. The creation of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (lCTY) in 1993 and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994 borrowed a page 
from the efforts in newly democratic societies to settle scores with 
perpetrators of mass atrocities. They were followed in later years by 
international support for "mixed" courts (applying domestic law with 
a combination of local and international judges and court personnel) 
in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Cambodia, and Lebanon. The United 
Nations has recognized that these principles are binding not only on 
I. Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras is the early decision establishing obligations to 
confront crimes against humanity, in that case, disappearances. Veilisquez-Rodriguez 
v. Honduras, Merits and Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.4 (July 29, 1988), 
available at http;llwwwl.urnn.edulhumanrts/iachrlb_II_12d.htm. It was followed by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Reports Nos. 28 and 29 dealing 
with impunity laws. Herrera v. Argentina, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 
10.309, 10.311, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 28/92, OENSer.LNIII.83, doc. 
14 (1992-1993), available at http;llwww.cidh.oas.orgiannualrep/92engiArgentina 
10.147.htm; Mendoze v. Uraguay, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 
10.373, 10.374, 10.375, Report No. 29192, OENSer.LNIII.83, doc. 14 (1992-1993), 
available at http://www.cidh.oas.orgiannualrep/92englUruguayl0.029.htm. 
Following these was a long list of decisions going in the same direction. See, e.g., 
Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, App. Nos. 23052/04, 24018/04, HUDOC (Jan. 17,2006), 
http://cmiskp.echr .coe.intltkp 197 Iview.asp ?item= 1 &portal=hbkm&action=html&high 
light=240 18/04&sessionid=6868224 7 &skin=hudoc-en (discussing prosecution for 
Communist atrocities in the late 1940s). 
2. Rep. on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations, 
Comm'n on Human Rights, Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, 49th Sess., Oct. 2, 1997, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.211997/20/Rev.I (Oct. 2, 1997) (by Louis Joinet), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN .4 .sub.2.1997 .20.Rev.1. 
En; Rep. of the Indep. Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, 
Comm'n on Human Rights, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 
2005) (by Diane Orentlicher), available at http://www.derechos.orglnizkorlimpu 
Iprinciples.html. Together, these reports, both issued within a decade, are a powerful 
illustration of the rapid evolution of international law in this area, a phenomenon that 
has been called a "justice cascade." Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice 
Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in latin America, 
2 Chi J. Int'I L. 1,4 (2001). 
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states but also on the organization itself as it tries to intervene in 
conflicts while upholding international law. 3 
The tipping point in this evolution is the 1998 Statute of Rome for 
the Creation of an International Criminal Court. First, the ICC is a 
permanent instrument for the realization of justice where the 
domestic jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to honor these 
obligations. Second, the Rome Statute clarifies and makes certain 
what is meant by notions like "crimes against humanity," which have 
been with us at least since Nuremberg but that lacked certainty as to 
their contours, primarily because their source was custom and not 
treaty. Finally, the Rome Statute is a tipping point because more than 
110 state parties and more than 160 signatories have pledged to 
cooperate with each other and with the ICC in breaking the cycle of 
impunity for international crimes. In an important way, it can be said 
that the effect of this evolution is to create a new paradigm in the 
manner in which conflicts of interest to the international community 
are to be resolved. If those conflicts involve genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity (and unfortunately they almost 
invariably do), the solution must reckon not only with the need to 
silence the guns but also to offer avenues of justice to the victims. 
III. PEACE AND JUSTICE 
Perhaps the first step is to recognize when a dilemma exists. On 
occasions, the dilemmas are artificially invoked by those who simply 
want to impose impunity.4 Frequently, however, the dilemma is very 
real, especially when the fighting and its accompanying brutality are 
still ongoing. In those situations, a firm insistence on accountability 
through the punishment of individuals who violate human rights 
3. U.N. Secretary General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies, UN. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 5, 2004), available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/docIUNDOC/GENIN04/395/29/PDFIN0439529.pdf? 
OpenElement. This report provides that States have an obligation to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish the perpetrators of such atrocities; that amnesties are contrary to 
international law; and that international tribunals can be used when the concerned 
state is not able or willing to carry out its obligations. Id. In 1999, the Secretary-
General adopted Guidelines for UN Mediators (revised and reaffirmed in 2005), 
which stated that the UN would not support peace arrangements that by their terms 
violate international law. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General 
Comments on Guidelines Given to Envoys SG/SMl7257 (Dec. 10,1999). 
4. For example, in the early and mid-80s in Latin America, a favorite argument of pro-
impunity actors was to say that justice demands, however legitimate they might be, 
would have the effect of destabilizing fledgling democratic regimes or of delaying the 
return to democracy in neighboring countries. 
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complicates a negotiation process meant to end the conflict that is the 
enabling environment for human rights abuses. 5 Recognition of the 
dilemma should not automatically lead to the conclusion that peace 
trumps justice even in those cases. Instead, the very real 
complication that justice presents must be seen in a constructive light: 
it may make peace more difficult, but it also forces all participants in 
the peace process to strive for better deals rather than acquiesce to the 
demands of the perpetrators. Instead of settling for that easy peace, 
which leaves behind open wounds that can later cause renewed 
fighting, the obligation to reckon with justice can lead to a 
substantive peace that has a better chance of being durable. 
It is also not always the case that an insistence on justice will make 
peace impossible. Quite the contrary, it is possible that the stigma 
and political isolation brought about by prosecution can act to 
separate those actors who, in addition to being. international 
criminals, are also the real spoilers of any serious agreement. The 
refusal to lift ICTY arrest warrants against Karadzic and Mladic not 
only did not impede the Dayton talks: it actually made it possible to 
reach an agreement to end the wars in the Former Yugoslavia. 
Conversely, a bad agreement can lead to further fighting and further 
atrocities, as was the case with the 1999 Lome Peace Agreement on 
the conflict in Sierra Leone. It included a blanket amnesty for 
perpetrators of atrocious crimes, and six months later, those same 
signers of the peace accord were fighting again, and again 
committing crimes by recruiting children and cutting off limbs of 
children, women, and innocent civilians. 6 Denial of justice in that 
accord was not only an insult added to the many injuries suffered by 
innocent Sierra Leoneans it was also the wrong way to pursue peace, 
as it could only result in emboldening and encouraging the enemies 
of peace. Like in the Balkans, lasting peace in Liberia was obtained 
only after President Charles Taylor, a notorious perpetrator of 
atrocities in his own country and a prime instigator of the conflict in 
Sierra Leone, was sidelined and eventually forced out of office after 
being indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
5. Juan E. Mendez, Peace, Justice and Prevention: Dilemmas and False Dilemmas, in 
DEALING WITH THE PAST AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CREATING CONDITIONS FOR 
PEACE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 15 (Mf> Bleeker, ed., 2006), available 
at http://biblioteca.hegoa.ehu.es/systemlebooks/163 74/ original/Dealing_with _the 
-past_and _ transitionaljustice. pdf. 
6. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone, art. IX, July 7, 1999, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.orgllomeaccord.html. 
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The key to solving the dilemma is to recognize that peace and 
justice are not simply policy objectives; they are also fundamental 
human values that should be fulfilled in their own right and for their 
own worth. It follows that it is a mistake to consider either peace or 
justice as an instrument to achieve the other. In this sense, 
prosecutions often have the effect of pushing reluctant parties to the 
bargaining table, perhaps with the belief that they can obtain amnesty 
through peace negotiations. All observers agree that that is exactly 
what prompted Joseph Kony to join the Juba talks, which, even if 
they ultimately did not result in peace in Northern Uganda, have 
certainly achieved a large measure of improvement in the situation. 
Instead, if the threat of arrest and prosecution is turned on and off to 
please a party to the conflict, such actions will only undermine the 
independence and impartiality of the courts and will encourage 
blackmailers to hold on for impunity. 
It is not necessarily true that even a bad peace agreement will 
automatically create the conditions for justice down the road. A 
myopic process that pursues peace at all costs and sacrifices 
accountability to peace, in fact, creates obstacles for redress for the 
victims and communities who have suffered systematic atrocities. In 
this sense, it is always advisable to build a process by which the 
victims of atrocities are heard in the context of the peace process so 
that they playa role in shaping the accord that will affect them and 
their community and thereby acquire some stake in making the 
agreement work. At Juba, parallel proceedings allowed the affected 
communities precisely such a role, and it resulted in a richer and 
more accurate understanding of their priorities and wishes. Kony 
manipulated the eagerness of the international community to appease 
criminals and repeatedly took advantage of the peace talks to regroup 
and rearm his forces. When he failed to obtain assurances of 
impunity, he ultimately sabotaged the process and went back to 
fighting and terrorizing the civilian population in neighboring 
countries, amply demonstrating that he was never serious about 
peace, which in turn greatly diminished his ability to gather support 
among his own people of Northern Uganda. 
Like Kony, other perpetrators of mass atrocities will always 
demand amnesty, though not necessarily as a precondition for talks. 
More often, amnesty will be proposed as part of the final settlement, 
that is to say, as part of the "package" of measures that will put an 
end to the fighting. In those cases, proposals for blanket amnesties 
will be presented as necessary for "national reconciliation." Such 
demands are a form of blackmail because the perpetrator demands to 
be allowed to get away with having committed crimes, or else he will 
372 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
continue to commit them. In those situations, the choice between 
peace and justice is artificial: if you choose one, you may get neither. 
Blanket amnesties are illegal in international law because they cover 
international crimes and because they are unconditional. They are a 
coercive means of compelling victims to reconcile with perpetrators, 
while denying those victims their internationally-required right to a 
remedy for the abuses they have suffered. They force the victims 
into a false "reconciliation" without allowing them the means by 
which to seek and obtain the basic elements of a genuine 
reconciliation. Parties that seek a blanket amnesty as a condition to 
peace are unlikely to be genuinely and seriously concerned with 
peace or in a position to guarantee it if agreed to. 
This is not to say that all amnesties are contrary to international 
law. In fact, Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions-a 
separate instrument approved in 1977 to apply specifically to 
conflicts not of an international character-contains a clause by 
which, at the end of hostilities, parties "shall endeavor" to grant each 
other a broad and generous amnesty. Numerous authorities clarify 
that such a clause is meant to immunize from prosecution those who 
have risen up in arms against the State, thereby committing the 
domestic crime of sedition, rebellion, or treason. It is for those 
offenses that amnesty is prescribed in Protocol II as a condition for 
the rebels to give up the fight and join the democratic political 
process. Clearly, it does not and should not benefit those in either 
camp that have fought their war in violation of fundamental 
principles of the laws of war. Nevertheless, it is amply evident that a 
limited amnesty is not only permissible but is also to be encouraged 
and included in peace processes. 
Amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity, especially 
for those bearing the highest responsibility for them, is not 
permissible, and, as seen above, it is also a bad idea. Should the 
peace agreement then contain specific norms delineating how and 
when those perpetrators will be brought to justice? That, of course, is 
a more difficult question because you cannot expect a signer of a 
peace accord to agree to a clause that will lead him straight to prison. 
In the Bonn Agreement of 2002, to bring peace between factions in 
Afghanistan after the temporary defeat of the Taliban, amnesty was 
discussed, and, since it was acknowledged that it would be contrary 
to international law, the final agreement was silent on the matter. 
Years later, this silence lent itself to widely differing interpretations: 
civil society organizations insisted on investigations and eventual 
prosecutions, while militia leaders (by then with seats in the 
legislative body) felt that the amnesty was implied in the accord. 
Impunity for the abuses of all factions reigns today in Afghanistan, 
2011] Transitional Justice, Peace, and Prevention 373 
although certainly not all the blame for it can be attributed to a faulty 
peace accord. 
Silence may be better than an explicit amnesty in violation of 
international law, but, as far as possible, peace accords should leave 
no doubt as to their intention regarding impunity and accountability. 
Some argue for "sequencing," meaning that an accord can specify 
that the actual investigation, prosecution, and criminal trials will take 
place at a later date or only after some other mileposts have been 
achieved. In principle, there is nothing wrong with that approach, as 
long as it may seem necessary to obtain peace and particularly 
because it brings up justice as an essential objective of the 
negotiations. It should be recognized, however, that sequencing 
requires victims to postpone their legitimate demands in a way that 
may not be required of other stakeholders. This inherent inequality, 
therefore, must be balanced with strong assurances and by other, 
more immediate and tangible results for the victims. In any event, 
sequencing in the domestic jurisdiction is almost a natural occurrence 
since by and large the national courts will not readily be equipped to 
deal with complex criminal prosecutions with necessary guarantees 
of fair trial and due process. In fact, even where courts are more or 
less in good shape at the end of the conflict, it is better to allow a 
truth-telling process to compile and organize the evidence that will 
make it easier to later establish prosecutorial priorities and ensure an 
orderly and stable program of trials to be held within a reasonable 
time frame.' 
If sequencing in the domestic jurisdiction is fraught with 
complications but is otherwise a legitimate way to approach our 
dilemma, it is much more problematic if the measure of justice to be 
accomplished relies primarily, if not exclusively, on the ICC. It is 
already very difficult to ensure compliance with ICC warrants and 
other orders, and a political decision to suspend investigations and 
judicial actions will mostly undermine the credibility of the ICC as an 
independent and impartial body and will tend to encourage 
defendants and potential defendants to challenge the ICC's 
jurisdiction through political decisions arrived at in negotiations. 
There are at least three ways in which the Rome Statute contemplates 
suspension of ICC activities, but each one of them should be 
considered carefully and as a last resort rather than as an expedient 
way to get rid of a problem.7 It must be borne in mind that, in an 
7. Article 16 allows the Security Council to suspend an investigation or prosecution 
through a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for one year and 
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international context, a suspension may well in practice become 
definitive and final, given the practical difficulties of resuming 
activities after a long pause. 
At the very least, clauses in peace agreements that limit or 
condition access to justice by the victims should never be adopted 
without meaningful consultation with all stakeholders and 
particularly with the victims. Indeed, as stated above, victims and 
their communities should have a say on all aspects of the peace 
process and on the substantive agreements being considered; but their 
participation is especially essential in all matters affecting impunity 
and accountability since it affects their fundamental right to see 
justice done. In this manner, the pursuit of justice allows victims to 
become players in a peace process that typically excludes them, 
focusing instead only on the parties to the conflict. Needless to say, 
the parties to the conflict will almost invariably have more of an 
interest in impunity than in justice. The inclusion of victims in a 
peace process through consultations or parallel discussions does not 
detract from the fundamental role that mediators and warring parties 
must have. In fact, it leads to a much more inclusive and sustainable 
peace precisely because it more assuredly achieves a pact that is 
consistent with international law. 
IV. PREVENTION 
Justice serves not only the retroactive purposes of accountability 
for acts committed but may also contribute to the prevention of future 
atrocities. That is why most international instruments, starting with 
the Genocide Convention of 1948,8 assume that we prevent future 
crimes by punishing those that have already taken place. According 
to the Rome Statute, a central object and purpose of the International 
Criminal Court is to contribute to the prevention of crimes of concern 
to the international community.9 There is, of course, scant empirical 
also allows that resolution to be renewed. Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, art. 16, adopted July 17, 1998, 2187 V.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 
2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.intINRirdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-
BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/Rome _ Statute_ English.pdf [hereinafter "Rome Statute"]. 
Article 19 provides that a State with domestic jurisdiction over a case may challenge 
the admissibility of a case to the ICC on the grounds that it is willing and able to 
afford justice. Rome Statute, art. 19(2)(b). Article 53 provides that the Prosecutor 
may make the decision to suspend activities "in the interests of justice," among other 
considerations. Rome Statute, art. 53(1)(c), (2)(c). 
8. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948,78 V.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12,1951). 
9. Rome Statute, Preamble. 
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evidence to show for this assumption, and yet the idea still carries 
considerable weight. If the deterrent effect of punishment is hard to 
show in the domestic jurisdiction and in relation to common crime, it 
is even harder when it comes to mass atrocities. The problem is 
compounded when we try to apply empirical evidence to the effect of 
international criminal justice since the latter is so recent in practice, 
and there are so few cases to analyze for their long term effects 
beyond the justice done in the relevant episode. 
Nevertheless, one can point to some anecdotal evidence of such a 
deterrent effect of international justice and perhaps even stronger 
evidence that pursuing justice for mass atrocity in the domestic scene 
yields benefits in the stability and quality of the democracy installed 
to replace dictatorship and conflict. \0 Prevention, however, is a 
complex and dynamic process that is never achieved through justice 
alone, much less once and for all through prosecution and 
punishment of some perpetrators. It is therefore important to think 
under what conditions justice can have a preventive effect. 11 
In the first place, the preventive and deterrent effect of justice is 
greatly enhanced if it is integrated into a more comprehensive plan of 
prevention of mass atrocities. In my role as Special Advisor to the 
UN Secretary-General on Prevention of Genocide (which I exercised 
between 2004 and 2007), I learned that effective prevention depends 
on acting simultaneously and with adaptability to circumstances in 
four areas: protection of populations at risk, humanitarian assistance 
to them, pursuit of peace on the underlying conflict, and justice and 
accountability for the crimes already committed. A second condition 
of effectiveness in prevention through justice is to pursue justice 
under its own rules and its legitimizing principles. In other words, 
justice will not deter future violations if it is perceived as an exercise 
in political manipulation, scapegoating, or show trials. Central to this 
goal is the preservation of the integrity, independence, and 
impartiality of the judicial organs. They should be allowed to do 
their work free of interference and actively supported in their 
10. See also Hunjoon Kim & Kathryn Sikkink, Do Human Rights Trials Make a 
Difference?, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 35 (Aug. 2007) 
("[T]rials deter future human rights violations by increasing the perception of the 
possibility of costs of repression for individual state officials."), available at 
http://pfdc.pgr.mpf.gov.br/atuacao-e-conteudos-de-apoio/publicacoes/direito-a-
memoria-e-a-verdadel Artigo _Kathryn _ S ikkink. pdf. 
11. Juan E. Mendez, Justice and Prevention (Aug. 2010) (presented to the Kampala 
Review Conference of the Assembly of State Parties of the ICC, June 2010) (on file 
with author). 
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decisions and orders. Third, prosecutions in the international arena 
will have a better chance to succeed in prevention if they are 
accompanied by efforts in the domestic jurisdiction under the 
principle of complementarity, not in competition over jurisdiction but 
in a harmonious division of labor. Fourth, the preventive effect of 
justice should not be considered only in relation to successful 
prosecutions and eventual penalties effectively imposed. Prevention 
can happen by the mere availability of the justice system in place, by 
the announcement of initial investigations or analysis of a situation, 
and even by reason of the entry into force of the Rome Statute for the 
country in question. Finally, it should be realized that even in the 
best of circumstances, prosecutions will proceed only with regard to a 
small number of the universe of cases and potential defendants. This 
is true of domestic as well as international prosecutions, even when 
both are combined. For that reason, it will be necessary to 
complement prosecutions with comprehensive and balanced 
initiatives of a non-judicial character that can reach a broader 
coverage of the complex and massive atrocities. 
It follows that the application of transitional justice mechanisms, in 
consultation with, and with full participation of, all stakeholders, will 
enhance the possibility that the indispensable criminal prosecutions 
will have a lasting, preventive effect over future violations. 
A. Prosecutions 
The presence of a justice mechanism in the domestic jurisdiction 
can serve to discourage the commission of atrocities. Human rights 
violations are enabled by a perception on the part of the perpetrators 
that they are unlikely to be held accountable for their actions. The 
existence of a justice mechanism that takes these violations seriously 
disrupts this calculus. The opposite is clearly documentable: 
potential perpetrators who are biding their time go into a frenzy of 
abuses as soon as they receive a clear signal that they will not be 
investigated. 
The commission of human rights abuses is often enabled by an 
environment of exception: a situation of conflict or emergency. An 
established and predictable set of laws and a system of justice 
provide regularity and normalcy even in the midst of the exceptional 
situation. The pursuit of accountability by strong and independent 
institutions creates a framework for justice, the existence of which 
informs potential perpetrators that even though there may be a 
conflict or some other emergency, justice will still be served even in 
extreme circumstances. 
On the other hand, the threat of prosecution will be taken less 
seriously by the perpetrators if they figure out that it is wielded 
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against them only for the purpose of persuading them to negotiate. 
Conspiring against the preventive effect of justice will be the 
perception of prolonged and ineffective bureaucratic inquiries with 
no prospects of real progress, and particularly of a judicial system 
that does not treat all persons equally. 
The courts must be open and accessible to all sectors of society, 
including the most vulnerable. Even those accused of committing 
atrocities should be afforded legal protection in order to entrench a 
culture of fairness by justice institutions. The accused must be 
effectively defended against the charges brought against them by 
counsel of their own choosing and be otherwise assured of the 
presumption of innocence and all other attributes of a fair trial. 
Institutions must build credibility and must therefore be willing to 
take on the most difficult issues in a society, including especially the 
investigation, prosecution, and eventual punishment of perpetrators 
of recent mass atrocities. 
B. Truth-Telling 
The opportunity to build a record of what happened within a given 
society is integral to empowering marginalized groups and creating a 
sense of shared history amongst all members of the community. By 
empowering those groups that are otherwise disenfranchised, truth-
telling provides them with an increased sense of social inclusion that 
minimizes other tensions. The effectiveness of a specific truth 
commission or commission of inquiry depends on many factors: the 
composition of its membership, the clarity of its mandate, the 
openness and transparency of its proceedings, the degree to which it 
affords the victims a forum to be heard, and the guarantees of due 
process it gives to persons identified as perpetrators. Fundamentally, 
its success depends on the quality, accuracy, and credibility of the 
report it produces and its impact on the society's awareness of the 
legacy of abuses it must confront. 
C. Reparations 
In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted GA Res. 
60/147,12 which laid out basic principles on reparations to victims of 
gross human rights violations originally proposed by Special 
Rapporteurs Theo van Boven and M. Cherif Bassiouni. 
12. G.A. Res. 601147, U.N. Doc. A!RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www 1. umn.edulhumanrts/instreelres60-14 7 .html. 
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Reparations must be seen as an act of justice as well as a symbolic 
act of atonement, rather than an attempt to restore the status quo ante. 
Moreover, reparations are not paid by an individual to another but 
rather by the State held accountable for the past abuse to the 
community as a whole, even in instances where the beneficiaries may 
in fact be certain identifiable persons. The offer of reparations 
represents recognition by the government and a coming to terms with 
the history that is itself a promise not to repeat. 
D. Institutional Reform 
The vetting component of transitional justice consists of a process 
by which officials known to have used their institutions as vehicles 
for human rights violations are prevented from continuing to serve in 
newly democratized police, military, or other forces and State 
institutions. It promotes the prevention of crimes by clearly 
demonstrating that positions of authority or prestige cannot be 
reached through the commission of human rights abuses. Creating 
strong and fair institutions under citizen control and with accountable 
leaders is a way of reinforcing civic trust and promoting the use of 
non-violent, institutional processes to resolve disputes and conflicts. 
E. Reconciliation 
Reconciliation is ordinarily not a fifth mechanism of transitional 
justice. Rather, when well understood, it is the objective and guiding 
principle of the whole enterprise of transitional justice. It especially 
should not be conceived of as an excuse to circumvent the obligation 
to provide for justice, truth, reparations, and institutional reform on 
the pretext that the society has to reconcile itself. In this sense, it is 
important to distinguish the concept of reconciliation as the ultimate 
resolution of the violent aspect of a conflict between warring factions 
from the discredited effort to impose a false reconciliation between 
perpetrator and victim without any effort on the part of the former 
and the whole burden placed on the latter. 
An exception to this is when the atrocities have had a clear ethnic, 
religious, or racial dimension because, in that case, the abuses are 
likely to be blamed not so much on the perpetrators but on the 
communities they claimed to represent. If so, the lack of an effort to 
distinguish between the guilty and their communities could lead in 
the future to revenge and renewed conflict, as descendants of the 
abusers are blamed for what their ancestors did to members of other 
communities. In places like Darfur, it will be important not only to 
have justice, truth, reparations, and institutional reform but also to 
complement them with inter-communal conversations between the 
Fur, Masaalit, Zhagawa and the leaders of the so-called Arab tribes 
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over issues like restoration of property, return to villages, water, 
passage, grazing rights for cattle, and ultimately the means to share 
equitably in political power in the region. 
F. Rise of International Criminal Justice 
The proliferation of international tribunals to serve justice for 
atrocities serves an important preventative role by filling a gap in 
accountability that exists when the territorial state is unable or 
unwilling to prosecute international crimes. With many of the worst 
human rights violations taking place in countries and regions ravaged 
with other forms of instability, perpetrators of human rights abuses 
had little reason to expect that they would be held to account for their 
actions. To the extent that the promise of impunity enables the 
commission of atrocities, a more complete system of accountability 
serves to deter the commission of international crimes, even if we are 
still witnessing the birth and infancy, not the maturity, of the system 
of international criminal justice. 
The rise of the internationalized courts, of mixed or hybrid courts, 
the ICC in particular, and the application by some domestic courts of 
universal jurisdiction helps to build a more complete system of 
accountability wherein perpetrators can be on notice that they will 
almost certainly be held to account for the atrocities they commit. In 
particular, the emergence of the ICC represents the potential for the 
international community, with its network of inter-governmental and 
civil society organizations, and state authorities to give voice to the 
experiences of many victims, whose stories may previously have 
gone untold in a national system if they came from a minority race or 
religion or were otherwise marginalized in a particular society. 
The promotion of domestic capacity by international tribunals 
through "legacy" initiatives, the outreach efforts of hybrid courts, and 
the "positive complementarity" applied by the ICC all promote a 
sense of local ownership and participation in justice. 13 As 
communities feel more connected to processes of justice, this helps to 
entrench a recognition of injustice amongst members of the society, 
which in tum results in a normative understanding that atrocious acts 
13. See Paul van Zyl, The Challenge o/Criminal Justice: Lessons Learned/rom 
International, Hybrid and Domestic Trials, in DEALING WITH THE PAST AND 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CREATING CONDITIONS FOR PEACE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 23 (M6 Bleeker, ed., 2006), available at 
http://biblioteca.hegoa.ehu.es/systemlebooks/ 163 74/ 
originaVDealing_ with_the J'ast_ and _ transitionaljustice.pdf. 
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should not be committed against others. The closer relationship 
between communities and criminal proceedings may also foster 
prevention by creating a society of informed witnesses. If 
community members feel connected to judicial processes, they may 
be more inclined to engage in community policing and monitoring of 
activities within their environment. The potential of a country full of 
witnesses, who could report these acts to national or international 
authorities, would likely be another deterrent to the commission of 
international crimes. 
I have had the privilege to serve as Special Adviser to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC on Crime Prevention, and in that capacity I 
have documented numerous circumstances that indicate an' effective 
role of justice initiatives in the prevention of atrocities. 
• Radhika Coomaraswamy, the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflict, testified 
before the ICC in early 2010 at the trial against Thomas 
Lubanga. In addition to describing the need for a legal 
framework that effectively protects vulnerable children, 
Coomaraswamy highlighted that the decision by the ICC to 
prosecute the conscription of child soldiers had led several 
armed groups worldwide to approach the UN in hopes of 
negotiating the release of child soldiers. 14 She 
acknowledged that "[t]he Lubanga trial represents a crucial 
precedent in the fight against impunity and will have a 
decisive deterrent effect against perpetrators of such 
crimes." 
• Human Rights Watch (HRW) also confirmed that the 
prosecutions in the Democratic Republic of Congo are 
having a preventive effect. HRW found that ICC 
prosecutions have resulted in an increased awareness of 
what constitutes criminal behavior, noting as an example 
the demobilization of child soldiers by a Central African 
Republic rebel commander after learning about the ICC's 
prosecution of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for conscription of 
child soldiers. 
• According to Samantha Power, the late Alison Des Forges 
of Human Rights Watch documented this most ably with 
respect to the Rwandan genocide, showing how 
14. The Office of the Prosecutor, Weekly Briefing: 22 December 2009 - II January 20/0, 
INTERNATIONAL CRlMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.intINRirdonlyres/C44612E2-
6A90-4389-A2DD-AEA31 EAAA2E4/281444/0TPWBENG.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 
2011). 
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every day-every single hour of every day-individuals 
who have never killed before are deciding how far they 
are going to go. Often, as they make those decisions, 
they are looking left, and looking right, and gauging 
likely consequences. Most possess normal moral 
compasses before they strike. One does not need to 
make extravagant claims for the International Criminal 
Court to note that the existence of a court that proves its 
staying power and its preparedness to make arrests 
would influence a first-time war criminal's behavior. 15 
• In November 2004 in Cote d'lvoire, the head of the national 
radio and television system was replaced at a time of 
heightened tensions between ethnic communities, with 
armed militias in the countryside and gangs of "Y oung 
Patriots" menacingly roving the streets of Abidjan. The 
newly appointed head unleashed a barrage of hate speech 
through the air waves that was eerily reminiscent of the 
days preceding the Rwandan genocide. SG Kofi Annan and 
the Security Council issued stem warnings. In my capacity 
as Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, I issued 
a statement to the effect that instigation to commit genocide 
is a crime under the Rome Statute and, since Cote d'lvoire 
had accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC, those responsible 
for hate speech that amounted to instigation could see 
themselves brought to The Hague to answer for their 
actions. We later learned that that prospect was actively 
considered by the legal advisors to the government, and the 
hate speech messages subsided after a hectic and tense 
weekend. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Transitional justice may be critical to ensuring peace and 
advancing prevention in relation to mass human rights violations. 
But, as I have recognized above, neither peace nor prevention can 
happen through justice alone. Prevention requires coordinated, 
15. Samantha Power, Stopping Genocide and Securing "Justice ": Learning by Doing, 69 
Soc. REs. 1093, 1100-01 (2002), available at 
http://commons. wvc.edu/jrninharo/pols203/ Articles%20to%20Choose%20FromIPOW 
ER%5Bl%5D.pdf. 
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simultaneous, dynamic action in four different areas: protection, 
relief, accountability, and peace talks to solve the underlying conflict. 
None of these actions can take primacy over the others, so justice 
alone will be insufficient to prevent crimes. Nonetheless, justice 
serves an important role in the process of transition and cannot be 
seen as subordinate, or even in opposition, to other efforts to promote 
peace. 
